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Abstract 
Of the many futuristic prospects offered by neuroscience, one of the more 
controversial is ‘brain reading’: the use of functional neuroimaging to gain 
information about subjects’ mental states or thoughts. This technology has 
various possible applications, including ‘neuromarketing’ and lie detection. 
Would such applications violate subjects’ privacy rights? Conversely, if God 
knows and judges all our secret thoughts, do Christians have any stake in 
defending a right to mental privacy? This article argues that God’s knowledge of 
us is different not only in degree but in kind from the knowledge sought through 
brain reading. This view of divine knowledge supports a theological account of 
privacy, richer and broader in scope than standard accounts of privacy rights, 
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which can aid the ethical analysis of the use of brain reading technology for 
purposes such as marketing and lie detection. 
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Introduction 
Of the various futuristic prospects promised by current neuroscience, one of the 
more controversial – and to some, alarming – must surely be what is variously 
known as ‘brain reading,’ ‘mind reading,’ ‘thought identification’ or the 
‘decoding of mental states.’ What is meant by this is the use of functional brain 
imaging techniques such as electroencephalography (EEG) or functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to gain knowledge of subjects’ mental states 
or thoughts. 
Opinions vary about the likely scope of brain reading. Even its enthusiasts admit 
that it is ‘still in its infancy,’1 and some argue that scientific and technical factors 
will seriously limit its scope for the foreseeable future.2 However, some 
relatively modest practical applications are already being promoted, and even 
these raise significant ethical questions. Furthermore, over-confidence about the 
power and usefulness of a new technology such as this may itself have ethically 
troubling outcomes. For these reasons, critical ethical appraisal of brain reading 
is certainly worth attempting. 
Brain reading has received some attention within the field of neuroethics, but 
little if any from theological ethicists. This article is an initial attempt to fill that 
gap. It begins with a brief account of functional neuroimaging and brain reading. 
Next, the ethical analysis of brain reading in the neuroethics literature is 
                                                     
1 John-Dylan Haynes, ‘Brain Reading: Decoding Mental States from Brain 
Activity in Humans,’ in Judy Illes and Barbara J. Sahakian (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Neuroethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 3-13 (p. 
6). 
2 Emily R. Murphy and Henry T. Greely, ‘What Will Be the Limits of 
Neuroscience-based Mindreading in the Law?’ in Illes and Sahakian (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics, pp. 635-53. 
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surveyed, focusing on concerns about privacy raised by two particular 
applications, ‘neuromarketing’ and neuroscience-based lie detection. In 
subsequent sections, a theological analysis of the ethics of brain reading is 
developed. This again focuses on privacy, which seems to be called into question 
by a Christian theological perspective. Drawing on the work of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, Rachel Muers and others, I argue that privacy remains a central 
concern for a Christian ethics of brain reading, but it must be reframed in light of 
core theological themes and perspectives. A theologically reframed account of 
privacy can inform the ethical analysis of brain reading, including 
neuromarketing and neuroscience-based lie detection.  
The science of brain reading 
According to John-Dylan Haynes, brain reading ‘requires that every mental state 
(“thought”) is associated with a characteristic pattern of brain activity.’3 Working 
on this assumption, researchers first attempt to identify that pattern of activity 
using functional imaging techniques such as EEG or fMRI. Then, if the same 
pattern is detected on another occasion, they infer that the subject is having the 
same thought. 
It is important to appreciate the challenges, limitations and pitfalls of this kind of 
approach. Some of these have to do with the various imaging techniques 
themselves, which have different kinds of technical limitations. They are also 
difficult to use, fMRI especially so.4 The relationship between brain activity and 
the signal detected in the MRI scanner is indirect and complex. The raw data 
from the scanner require a good deal of sophisticated statistical processing, 
during which it is surprisingly easy for errors and artefacts to be introduced. 
                                                     
3 Haynes, ‘Brain Reading,’ p. 4. 
4 Nikos K. Logothetis, ‘What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do with fMRI,’ 
Nature 453 (2008), pp. 869-78, DOI: 10.1038/nature06976. 
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With any technique, it can be difficult to be sure that the brain activity detected 
is associated with the mental states or thoughts one is interested in. Results 
obtained in the rather alien environment of the laboratory may not be valid in the 
outside world – the problem known as ‘ecological validity.’ Moreover, the 
conceptualisation and design of many brain imaging studies involves non-trivial 
psychological, philosophical and (at least implicitly) theological assumptions. 
Flawed or questionable assumptions may shape or distort the study design and 
therefore the results and conclusions. Indeed, the basic working assumption of 
brain reading stated by Haynes, quoted above, already implies at least one quite 
significant claim, which will be revisited later. 
In addition to these general limitations, brain reading is subject to some more 
specific challenges. One is that the vast complexity of the human brain severely 
limits what might be achieved for the foreseeable future. A ‘universal mind 
reading machine,’5 which could map and decode the complete state of the brain 
at any instant, is, as Emily Murphy and Henry Greely put it, ‘far beyond 
unapproachable.’6 Researchers therefore focus on much more modest and 
specific goals. Another challenge is that individuals’ brains are different and 
change over time, so it is not guaranteed that a mental state will be correlated 
with the same brain activity pattern in different people, or even in the same 
people at different stages of their lives.7 
Despite these limitations and challenges, brain reading researchers claim some 
successes. For example, Haynes and his colleagues have reported that they could 
predict subjects’ intentions from their patterns of brain activity before those 
intentions were acted upon, and to some extent even before the subjects were 
                                                     
5 Haynes, ‘Brain Reading,’ p. 6. 
6 Murphy and Greely, ‘What Will Be the Limits of Neuroscience-Based 
Mindreading?’ p. 638. 
7 Ibid., pp. 639-41. 
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conscious of having made up their minds.8 Others have claimed to distinguish 
between different kinds of images (for example, faces and places) that subjects 
were viewing or imagining.9 
Brain reading has diverse applications. For example, it can be used in brain-
computer interfaces, which enable subjects to control devices by generating 
particular patterns of brain activity.10 It has also been used to detect conscious 
awareness in patients diagnosed with disorders of consciousness such as 
vegetative or minimally conscious states.11 Applications like these raise a wide 
                                                     
8 John-Dylan Haynes et al., ‘Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain,’ 
Current Biology 17 (2007), pp. 323-28; Chun Siong Soon et al., ‘Unconscious 
Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain,’ Nature Neuroscience 11 
(2008), pp. 543-45. This work builds on the well-known, but controversial, 
studies of Benjamin Libet in the 1980s: see Benjamin Libet, ‘Do We Have Free 
Will?’ Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1999), pp. 47–57, and Benjamin 
Libet, ‘The Timing of Mental Events: Libet’s Experimental Findings and Their 
Implications,’ Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2002), pp. 291-99, DOI: 
10.1006/ccog.2002.0568. For an extensive and valuable collection of recent 
essays on the issues raised by Libet’s work, see Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and 
Lynn Nadel (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin 
Libet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Some theological and ethical 
implications of this work are explored in Neil Messer, Theological Neuroethics: 
Christian Ethics Meets the Science of the Human Brain (London: Bloomsbury T 
& T Clark, 2017), pp. 71-104. 
9 Murphy and Greely, ‘What Will Be the Limits of Neuroscience-Based 
Mindreading?’ p. 636. 
10 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Novel Neurotechnologies: Intervening in the 
Brain (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2013), pp. 28-35.  
11 Adrian M. Owen, ‘When Thoughts Become Actions: Neuroimaging in Non-
responsive Patients,’ in Sarah Richmond, Geraint Rees and Sarah J. L. Edwards 
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range of ethical issues, which are beyond the scope of a single paper to discuss in 
depth.12 This article therefore focuses on two other applications, both of which in 
different ways raise ethical questions about privacy. 
First is neuromarketing, which refers to the use of neuroscience in various ways 
to understand and influence consumers’ purchasing behaviour.13 Neuroscientific 
studies have provided new insights into the importance of non-conscious 
emotional or affective processes in guiding consumers’ decisions. One 
neuromarketing approach, building on this research, would use brain imaging to 
study volunteers’ affective responses to various marketing stimuli. The 
information gained would be used to design modified marketing approaches that 
were more effective in targeting consumers’ affective responses and influencing 
them to purchase products.14 In a more ambitious approach – unlikely to be 
feasible with current technology – individual consumers entering a marketplace 
would be subjected to brain imaging. Information about their cognitive and 
affective responses would then be used to target personalised marketing to them 
                                                     
(eds.), I Know What You’re Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 73-87.  
12 For a theological and ethical analysis of the detection of covert awareness in 
disorders of consciousness, see Messer, Theological Neuroethics, pp. 105-42. 
13 By the early 2010s it was estimated that there were already over 300 
commercial organisations active in this area: Yesim Isil Ulman, Tuna Cakar and 
Gokcen Yildiz, ‘Ethical Issues in Neuromarketing: “I Consume, Therefore I 
am!”’ Science and Engineering Ethics 21 (2015), pp. 1271-84, DOI: 
10.1007/s11948-014-9581-5 (p. 1272). 
14 R. Mark Wilson, Jeannie Gaines, and Ronald Paul Hill, ‘Neuromarketing and 
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in order to influence their individual purchasing behaviour.15 Whether this 
personalised approach will ever be technically possible is far from clear. 
The second application is lie detection, to which there are two basic 
approaches.16 One, the so-called ‘control question’ approach, is to try and 
identify the different patterns of brain activity correlated with making true and 
false statements. Then, if subjects are asked questions of interest and a pattern of 
brain activity associated with deception is detected, the inference is that they are 
lying. The other approach uses the ‘guilty knowledge test.’ Criminal suspects, 
for example, might be asked questions to which only someone present at the 
crime scene would know the answers, or shown images that only someone 
present at the scene would recognise. If their brain activity patterns suggest they 
know the information or recognise the images, it is inferred that they were 
present when the crime was committed. Brain reading for lie detection has 
obvious interest for the police, the criminal justice system and the security 
services, but has also been promoted as a way to detect deception in business, 
employment and even personal relationships.17  
Researchers have claimed some success with both approaches, but in addition to 
the general challenges outlined earlier, lie detection raises more specific 
concerns. One is that different researchers’ findings are partly but not fully 
                                                     
15 Ibid., pp. 398-99. 
16 Paul Root Wolpe et al., ‘Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie-Detection: 
Promises and Perils,’ American Journal of Bioethics 5.2 (2005), pp. 39-49, DOI: 
10.1080/15265160590923367 (pp. 40-41). 
17 Robert L. Mitchell, ‘Sex, Lies, and MRIs,’ online at 
https://www.computerworld.com/article/2538636/sex--lies-and-mris.html 
(accessed 22 October 2019). 
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consistent with each other.18 A second is the problem of ecological validity, 
raised earlier: this arises particularly sharply with neuroscience-based lie 
detection, since most laboratory studies have used simple, artificial tasks with far 
less emotional salience than the real-world situations that the techniques would 
be used to investigate. Thirdly, it has been suggested that it might be possible to 
train oneself to fool these tests, though this is a matter of dispute. Finally, there 
are indications that in real-world situations, current approaches would have a 
high rate of false positives (incorrectly identifying people as lying) which would 
of course be particularly dangerous in criminal justice or security contexts.19 For 
these reasons, most researchers agree that it is too early to use these techniques 
in the real world, though this has not stopped various for-profit companies 
offering neuroscience-based lie detection services.20 To date, neuroscience-based 
lie detection has played only a limited role in the US courts and apparently none 
in England and Wales, though in India it played a controversial role in a murder 
conviction (subsequently overturned) in 2008.21 
                                                     
18 Martha J. Farah et al., ‘Functional MRI-based Lie Detection: Scientific and 
Societal Challenges,’ Nature Reviews Neuroscience 15 (2014), pp. 123-31, 
DOI:10.1038/nrn3665 
19 Ibid., p. 126. 
20 For example, https://www.larryfarwell.com/brain-fingerprinting-laboratories-
inc.html (accessed 22 October 2019). 
21 Paul Catley and Lisa Claydon, ‘The use of neuroscientific evidence in the 
courtroom by those accused of criminal offenses in England and Wales,’ Journal 
of Law and the Biosciences 2.3 (2015), pp. 510-49, DOI: 10.1093/jlb/lsv025 (p. 
513); Francis X. Shen et al., ‘The limited effect of electroencephalography 
memory recognition evidence on assessments of defendant credibility,’  
Journal of Law and the Biosciences 4.2 (2017), pp. 330-64, DOI: 
10.1093/jlb/lsx005; Lisa Claydon and Paul Catley, ‘If a Brain is Caught Lying, 
Should We Admit That Evidence to Court? Here’s What Legal Experts Think,’ 
10 
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Ethical issues raised by brain reading 
Several commentators, including Neil Levy, suggest that the most immediate 
ethical concern about brain reading is over-confidence about what the 
technology can achieve, resulting in premature use. As Levy puts it, ‘[t]he aura 
of prestige and objectivity which surrounds science generally is perhaps even 
stronger in relation to the science of the mind at its cutting edge.’22 There is a 
danger of great harm if the ‘seductive allure’ of neuroscientific findings leads 
courts and other public institutions to be over-impressed by confident claims 
made for brain reading, particularly by commercial organisations with an interest 
in promoting it.23 However, there is some evidence to suggest that this concern is 
over-stated.24 
Beyond over-confidence and premature use, one of the main concerns raised 
about neuromarketing and neuroscience-based lie detection is that in different 
ways, both threaten subjects’ privacy. Indeed, brain reading is sometimes seen as 
a particularly acute threat to privacy, because our brains and minds are so closely 
connected to our personhood and sense of self.25  
                                                     
The Conversation, August 2, 2017, https://theconversation.com/if-a-brain-can-
be-caught-lying-should-we-admit-that-evidence-to-court-heres-what-legal-
experts-think-80263 (accessed 24 July 2019). 
22 Neil Levy, Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 144.  
23 Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., ‘The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience 
Explanations,’ Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 20.3 (2008), pp. 470-77, DOI: 
10.1162/jocn.2008.20040.  
24 Shen et al., ‘The limited effect of EEG memory recognition evidence.’ 
25 Sarah E. Stoller and Paul Root Wolpe, ‘Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie 
Detection and the Fifth Amendment,’ American Journal of Law and Medicine 33 
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What is meant by privacy in these debates, and why might it matter ethically? 
The concept of a right to privacy has been discussed and debated since the 
nineteenth century,26 and space does not permit a survey of that whole 
discussion. However, Mark Tunick offers a representative recent account.27 Like 
others, he identifies various aspects of privacy. Perhaps the most obvious in the 
present context is informational privacy, ‘the ability to control who has access to 
information about oneself.’28 In this perspective, information is sometimes 
thought of as a kind of property, and the right to privacy as a kind of property 
right, though it has often been pointed out that information does not behave like 
more familiar kinds of property, and there are significant differences between 
                                                     
(2007), pp. 359-75 (pp. 371-72); C. M Halliburton, ‘How Privacy Killed Katz: A 
Tale of Cognitive Freedom and the Property of Personhood as Fourth 
Amendment Norm,’ Akron Law Review 42 (2009), pp. 803-884 (p. 868), quoted 
by Roger Brownsword, ‘Regulating Brain Imaging: Questions of Privacy, 
Informed Consent, and Human Dignity,’ in Richmond et al. (eds.), I Know What 
You’re Thinking, pp. 223-44 (p. 229). 
26 Discussions of privacy rights frequently take as their starting point Samuel D. 
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy,’ Harvard Law Review 4.5 
(1890), pp. 193-220. Warren and Brandeis, citing Judge Thomas Cooley, define 
a privacy right as the right ‘to be let alone’ (ibid., p. 195). 
27 Mark Tunick, ‘Privacy and Punishment,’ Social Theory and Practice 39.4 
(2013), pp. 643-68, DOI: 10.5840/soctheorpract201339436; Mark Tunick, ‘Brain 
Privacy and the Case of Cannibal Cop,’ Res Publica 23.2 (2017), pp. 179-96, 
DOI 10.1007/s11158-017-9352-7.  
28 Tunick, ‘Brain Privacy and the Case of Cannibal Cop,’ p. 187. See also 
Brownsword, ‘Regulating Brain Imaging,’ p. 226. 
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privacy and property rights.29 A second aspect is decisional privacy, which in 
Tunick’s words ‘lets us set our own goals and act on them.’30 Thirdly, there is 
what he calls local privacy, which ‘lets us exclude others from our own 
spaces.’31 
According to Tunick, a moral right to privacy can be based on individuals’ 
interests in their autonomy and dignity. Autonomy is obviously related to 
decisional privacy, but Tunick also suggests various ways in which 
informational privacy also supports personal autonomy: for example by 
supporting identity formation, enabling us to choose how we present ourselves to 
others, supporting intimate relationships, and protecting us from manipulation.32 
As for dignity, Tunick argues that privacy protects us against the kinds of 
indignity that consist in ‘being exposed or accessed by others without one’s 
consent.’33 We have a moral right to privacy, he argues, if these interests are not 
outweighed by legitimate competing interests of others. 
In this framework, it is clear how neuromarketing could compromise 
individuals’ autonomy, and lie detection could threaten both autonomy and 
dignity. Whether either practice thereby infringed a right to privacy would 
depend on the weight given to the competing interests in each case, such as 
companies’ interests in selling more of their products, or society’s interest in 
preventing or detecting a crime. 
                                                     
29 Brownsword, ‘Regulating Brain Imaging,’ pp. 227-28; Rachel Muers, Keeping 
God’s Silence: Towards a Theological Ethics of Communication (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2004), pp. 184-86.  
30 Tunick, ‘Privacy and Punishment,’, p. 650. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., pp. 650-55. 
33 Ibid., p. 654. 
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It might be objected that in all the scenarios outlined, privacy concerns can be 
allayed by consent. Current neuroimaging technology requires subjects’ co-
operation to obtain meaningful data, so in any currently feasible neuromarketing 
or lie-detection scenario, subjects would have consented to the brain reading 
procedures used. However, consent is not a panacea against concerns about 
privacy. Should neuroscience-based lie detection become accepted practice in 
employment or criminal investigation, for example, some people could find 
themselves required to undergo it on pain of various sanctions. Even if they co-
operated, it may be asked how freely they would have consented. As for 
neuromarketing, in presently feasible scenarios, the targets of marketing 
interventions would not for the most part be the individuals who had agreed to 
provide their brain imaging data. And if, as Wilson et al. speculate, future 
imaging technologies ever allowed covert collection of imaging data from 
individuals, this would raise far greater concerns about privacy and consent.34 
Aside from consent-based objections, some authors are sceptical on other 
grounds about these ethical concerns. Some of these objections, in effect, call 
into question Tunick’s view that we have a strong interest in mental privacy. For 
example, using a thought experiment in which highly advanced technology 
would give the general public extensive access to one another’s thoughts, Sarah 
Richmond concludes that concerns about mental privacy are over-stated.35 Jesper 
Ryberg observes that humans have evolved a natural ability to ‘read’ one 
another’s minds. He argues that it is difficult to show how neuroscience-based 
                                                     
34 Wilson, Gaines, and Hill, ‘Neuromarketing and Consumer Free Will,’ pp. 401-
404. 
35 Sarah Richmond, ‘Brain Imaging and the Transparency Scenario,’ in 
Richmond et al. (eds.), I Know What You’re Thinking, pp. 185-203. 
14 
 
This is the manuscript of an article accepted for publication in Studies in 
Christian Ethics. It is not the copy of record. Copyright © 2020, SAGE 
Publications. 
mind reading violates a right to mental privacy, if we regard this everyday 
natural ‘mind reading’ as morally unproblematic.36  
The main aim of this paper, however, is not to contribute to these philosophical 
debates in their own terms, but to offer a theological response to them. That is 
the task to which I now turn. 
The scanner and the eye of God 
It does not take much imagination to hear, in descriptions of neuroscience-based 
brain reading, echoes of biblical texts depicting God’s complete knowledge of 
human creatures. In the words of Psalm 139, the technology seems to allow its 
users to ‘discern [our] thoughts from afar’ (v. 2, NRSV). At present it is going 
too far to claim that ‘before a word is on my tongue’ a neuroscientist can ‘know 
it completely’ (v. 4, emphasis added), but researchers like Haynes claim 
significant progress in that direction.37 The forensic uses of brain reading 
described earlier might suggest that human agents are now able to imitate God in 
not only knowing, but also ‘judg[ing] the secret thoughts of all’ (Romans 2:16). 
If we believe that God sees all there is to see of us, discerning and judging even 
our most secret thoughts, how concerned should we be if new technologies allow 
humans, in limited ways, to imitate aspects of that divine knowledge? There are 
various reasons why the concerns about privacy outlined in the last section might 
seem to sit oddly within a Christian ethical frame of reference. 
For a start, those privacy concerns are framed in terms of individual autonomy 
and rights, which seems to presuppose an anthropology rather distant from a 
theological understanding of ourselves as God’s creatures, reconciled in Christ 
                                                     
36 Jesper Ryberg, ‘Neuroscience, Mind Reading and Mental Privacy,’ Res 
Publica 23.2 (2017), pp. 197-211, DOI: 10.1007/s11158-016-9343-0 
37 Haynes et al., ‘Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain.’ 
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and heirs to the promise of redemption. The ultimate destiny of such reconciled 
and redeemed creatures does not seem to have much place for privacy, for 
keeping knowledge of ourselves back from one another.38 According to Paul, at 
the eschaton we shall know fully and be fully known (1 Cor. 13:12). And 
although that is then, not now, we find penultimate echoes of this eschatological 
community, for example in the vignettes of the early church in the book of Acts, 
in which the believers ‘were together and had all things in common’ (Acts 2:44). 
This vision has been reflected at many times in Christian history by forms of 
Christian community whose members have practised disciplines of common life, 
openness and mutual accountability.39 
In short, should Christians recognise the desire for privacy as alien to Christian 
life? And if so, can technologies such as brain reading be seen as potentially 
benign human imitations of divine knowledge, fitting for creatures made in the 
image of God? 
Perhaps; but in the Christian tradition, knowledge is not always innocent or 
benign. In Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s reading of the Genesis 3 ‘Fall’ narrative, the 
quest for God-like knowledge lies at the heart of the humans’ attempt to be sicut 
deus, ‘like God’.40 For Bonhoeffer, this attempt amounts to a refusal of our 
                                                     
38 Muers, Keeping God’s Silence, pp. 187, 210. 
39 One well-known historical example can be found in the Banden of the 
eighteenth-century Moravians and their major influence on the band and class 
meetings of early Methodism: see Kevin M. Watson, Pursuing Social Holiness: 
The Band Meeting in Wesley’s Thought and Popular Methodist Practice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).  
40 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 
1-3 (Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, vol. 3, ed. Martin Rüter, Ilse Tödt and John W. 
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proper status as creatures made in God’s image (imago dei), and it is the original 
disaster that divides us and separates us from our ‘origin’ in God our Creator. So 
is the use of technology to gain knowledge of others’ secret thoughts the kind of 
activity proper to the imago dei, or is it better understood as an attempt to be 
sicut deus? To answer that question, we need to enquire more deeply into the 
character of the knowledge sought in brain reading. 
Psalm 139 and the Panopticon 
This is of course not the first technology to invite comparisons with divine 
omniscience. According to David Lyon, Jeremy Bentham alluded to Psalm 139 
in the design for his model prison, the Panopticon: ‘Thou art about my path, and 
about my bed; and spiest out all my ways.’41 In Bentham’s design, the prison (or 
for that matter the hospital, school or factory) was configured so that an 
inspector was always able to see all the inmates, while remaining invisible to 
them. Thanks to Michel Foucault, the Panopticon has often been regarded as the 
paradigm of modern surveillance42 – although in recent surveillance studies it is 
                                                     
41 David Lyon, ‘Surveillance and the Eye of God,’ Studies in Christian Ethics 
27.1 (2014), pp. 21-32, DOI: 10.1177/0953946813509334 (p. 26). The quotation 
is from v. 2 in the Book of Common Prayer Psalter (= v. 3 in NRSV). 
42 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (trans. Alan 
Sheridan, London: Penguin, 1991), pp. 195-228. 
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often said to be an inadequate image43 – and Bruce Arrigo regards brain reading 
as a further intensification of panoptic surveillance.44 
Yet the relationship between the Panopticon and Psalm 139 turns out to be more 
complex than we might initially suspect. As Lyon remarks, in Bentham’s 
account the ‘secular omniscience’ promised by the Panopticon functioned as a 
substitute for the eye of God.45 To maintain social order it was no longer 
necessary for people to know that they were seen by God: the knowledge that 
they were (or could be) observed by the inspector would do just as well. 
                                                     
43 See Gilbert Caluya, ‘The post-panoptic society? Reassessing Foucault in 
surveillance studies,’ Social Identities 16.5 (2010), pp. 621-33, DOI: 
10.1080/13504630.2010.509565; Eric Stoddart, Theological Perspectives on a 
Surveillance Society: Watching and Being Watched (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 
pp. 1-2, 16-25; Ivan Manokha, ‘Surveillance, Panopticism, and Self-Discipline in 
the Digital Age,’ Surveillance and Society 16.2 (2018), pp. 219-37. Critics of 
‘panopticism’ as an image of contemporary surveillance do not always fully 
acknowledge how for Foucault, the Panopticon’s significance is in large part that 
it encouraged the objects of surveillance to internalise the inspector’s 
requirements and police themselves. It is thus a symbol of what he calls the 
disciplinary society, in which power assumes ‘capillary forms of existence, … 
reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies, and inserts itself 
into their actions and attitudes, their discourse, learning processes, and everyday 
lives’: Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1972-1977 (ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon et al., New York: 
Pantheon, 1980), p. 39, quoted by Bruce A. Arrigo, ‘Punishment, Freedom, and 
the Culture of Control: The Case of Brain Imaging and the Law,’ American 
Journal of Law and Medicine 33 (2007), pp. 457-82 (p. 466). 
44 Arrigo, ‘Punishment, Freedom, and the Culture of Control,’ pp. 473-76. 
45 Lyon, ‘Surveillance and the Eye of God,’ p. 26. 
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In some recent discussions, this secularised notion of omniscience seems to have 
been projected back onto God. David Elliott and Eldon Soifer, for example, 
describe God’s knowledge of us as ‘total observation’: language redolent of the 
Panopticon, depicting God as the ultimate Inspector. Elliott and Soifer argue that 
this does indeed infringe our privacy, but God has a ‘defensible excuse and 
justification’ for this infringement.46 The excuse is that God, being omniscient, 
cannot help it.47 The justification is threefold: first, God as Creator of all has the 
authority to engage in total observation, by analogy with the authority that 
parents have over their children; second, the exercise of God’s perfect justice 
requires total observation; third, God’s perfect goodness means that total 
observation promotes the objective good of human creatures.48 
This way of speaking about privacy and divine omniscience could be described, 
paraphrasing Karl Barth, as speaking of divine knowledge by speaking of human 
knowledge in a loud voice.49 But whether or not one agrees with Barth about the 
impossibility of conducting authentically Christian God-talk in this way, the 
                                                     
46 David Elliott and Eldon Soifer, ‘Divine Omniscience, Privacy, and the State,’ 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 82.3 (2017), pp. 251-71, DOI 
10.1007/s11153-017-9612-7 (p. 252). This is a recent contribution to an ongoing 
discussion about divine omniscience and privacy in the philosophy of religion, 
which includes: Charles Taliaferro, ‘Does God Violate your Right to Privacy?’ 
Theology 92 (1989), pp. 190-96; Margaret Falls-Corbitt and F. Michael McLain, 
‘God and Privacy,’ Faith and Philosophy 9.3 (1992), pp. 369-86; Scott A. 
Davison, ‘Privacy and Control,’ Faith and Philosophy 14.2 (1997), pp. 137-51. 
47 Ibid., pp. 255-56, contra Falls-Corbitt and McLain, ‘God and Privacy,’ who 
argue that God chooses to limit divine knowledge of us out of respect for our 
privacy. 
48 Elliott and Soifer, ‘Divine Omniscience, Privacy, and the State,’ pp. 262-65. 
49 Cf. Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man (trans. Douglas Horton 
Smith, New York: Harper, 1957), p. 196. 
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story does not end there. This secularised notion of omniscience, projected onto 
God, is then turned back onto human beings. Elliott and Soifer’s justification for 
God’s total observation supplies a set of criteria that could justify human 
agencies (including states) in infringing the privacy of others.50 In short, in the 
two centuries or so from Bentham’s Panopticon Letters to Elliott and Soifer’s 
article, a biblical and theological understanding of God’s complete knowledge of 
us has been secularised into a proposal for exercising certain kinds of social 
control, that secularised version has come to shape how divine omniscience is 
understood, and the resulting account of divine omniscience has furnished 
criteria to justify human practices of observation and privacy infringement. 
Hearing knowledge 
This curiously reciprocal relationship between conceptions of divine and human 
knowledge suggests that both are understood in essentially the same way, the 
way knowledge is also typically understood in neuroscientific, philosophical and 
legal discussions of brain reading. In this way of thinking, knowledge is 
information,51 neutral in itself and independent in principle of any particular 
relationship, and, if obtained or surrendered, might be used for benign or malign 
purposes.  
                                                     
50 Elliott and Soifer, ‘Divine Omniscience, Privacy, and the State,’ pp. 265-67. 
51 In a concluding section on different accounts of privacy, Elliott and Soifer (pp. 
267-70) do broaden the discussion beyond information. Alongside informational 
privacy they consider other aspects similar to what Tunick calls ‘decisional’ and 
‘local’ privacy. However, their aim in that section is to show that their theory of 
‘just privacy infringement’ is applicable to these various notions of privacy. This 
does not really contradict my point, that when they are discussing either divine 
or human knowledge of humans, what they have in mind is summarised by the 
univocal category of ‘observation.’ 
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A contrasting way to conceive of divine knowledge is suggested by Rachel 
Muers in dialogue with Dietrich Bonhoeffer.52 In an essay fragment written 
during his imprisonment and interrogation, Bonhoeffer poses the question, 
‘What does it mean to tell the truth?’53 He rejects the idea that one can tell the 
truth ‘in all places and at all times and to every person in the same way,’ 
describing this as ‘a dead idolatrous image of the truth … Satan’s truth.’54 He 
argues instead that ‘“telling the truth” means different things depending on 
where one finds oneself.’55 What counts as truthful depends on the context of 
concrete particular relationships; this is the case not only in relation to fellow-
humans but also for truthfulness to God, since the God of whom we are speaking 
is ‘the God who in Jesus Christ came into the world.’56 While the way in which 
Bonhoeffer develops this argument is problematic in some respects,57 the basic 
insight is valuable and important.  
                                                     
52 Muers, Keeping God’s Silence, pp. 188-212. See also, in similar vein, Lyon, 
‘Surveillance and the Eye of God,’ pp. 28-30. 
53 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ‘Fragment of an Essay: What Does it Mean to Tell the 
Truth?’ in Conspiracy and Imprisonment: 1940-1945 (Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
Works vol. 16, ed. Jørgen Glenthøj et al., trans. Lisa E. Dahill and Douglas W. 
Stott, Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2006), pp. 601-608. 
54 Ibid., p. 604. 
55 Ibid., p. 602. 
56 Ibid. 
57 For instance, in one of his examples, ‘a teacher asks a child in front of the 
class whether … the child’s father often comes home drunk. It is true, but the 
child denies it’ (Ibid., p. 605). Bonhoeffer argues that this denial is more truthful 
than an affirmation would have been, because ‘it expresses the truth that the 
family is an order sui generis where the teacher was not justified to intrude’ (p. 
606). In view of what we now know about the serious harms done to children in 
some families, this claim calls for some critical reappraisal, to say the least. 
21 
 
This is the manuscript of an article accepted for publication in Studies in 
Christian Ethics. It is not the copy of record. Copyright © 2020, SAGE 
Publications. 
Building on Bonhoeffer’s essay, Muers argues that what we understand by 
divine knowledge must also be re-thought theologically: God’s knowledge of 
human creatures belongs in, and takes its character from, particular covenant 
relationships. Drawing on the Exodus narrative, in which Moses is told that God 
has heard the cries of the Israelites and knows their suffering (Exod. 3:7), Muers 
calls this ‘hearing knowledge.’58 This is not abstract, detached knowledge-as-
information, which could equally be put to benign or malign purposes. Hearing 
knowledge is inseparable from divine compassion and God’s promise to act on 
behalf of God’s people. One could put the point slightly differently, echoing 
Barth, by saying that the God who knows us completely is the God who has 
determined, from all eternity, to be ‘with and for’ humanity in Jesus Christ.59 
As Muers also emphasises, divine knowledge is inseparable from divine 
judgement.60 This is also evident in some of the biblical texts already cited: for 
example, Paul tells the Romans that God will judge the secret thoughts of all 
(Rom. 2:16). The connection between knowledge and judgement made in this 
text might seem to bring us closer to the forensic knowledge sought through 
neuroscience-based lie detection, aiming to decode ‘secret thoughts’ that may be 
used to ‘accuse or perhaps excuse’ suspects or defendants (cf. Rom. 2:15). But 
once again, the meaning of the divine judgement associated with God’s 
knowledge of us is not univocal with the human knowledge and judgement 
associated with the criminal justice system.61 Paul writes that ‘God, through 
Jesus Christ, will judge the secret thoughts of all.’ The one through whom we 
are known and judged by God is, in Barth’s phrase, the Judge judged in our 
                                                     
58 Muers, Keeping God’s Silence, p. 198 et passim. 
59 Cf. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 4.1 (ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. 
Torrance, trans. G. W. Bromiley, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956), p. 40. 
60 Muers, Keeping God’s Silence, 195. 
61 Bonhoeffer makes a similar, indeed sharper, contrast: ‘What Does it Mean to 
Tell the Truth?’ pp. 604-05. Cf. Muers, Keeping God’s Silence, pp. 201-04. 
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place.62 God’s knowledge and judgement of us cannot be thought about apart 
from the incarnation, cross and resurrection; divine judgement is always also 
divine grace, oriented to our salvation. 
If God’s knowledge of us has the character suggested by Muers’ reading of 
Bonhoeffer, it would be a serious distortion to portray it as essentially 
knowledge-as-information. The latter is neutral, abstracted from any relationship 
with its object, and could equally well be put to benign or malign uses. Elliott 
and Soifer’s portrayal of divine and human knowledge risks this distortion. 
Although they certainly wish to speak of God’s knowledge in the context of 
God’s love and care, they subsume everything from state surveillance through 
parental knowledge of children to divine knowledge under the blunt category of 
‘observation.’ This leaves insufficient room for the insight, suggested by Muers’ 
analysis, that God’s knowledge of us may differ from the knowledge gathered 
(for example) by the Stasi in Communist East Germany not only in the uses to 
which it is put, but also in the character of the knowledge itself. 
Knowledge-as-information undoubtedly has its place in many spheres of human 
life, including scientific research.63 However, the analysis in this section, 
drawing on Muers and Bonhoeffer, has suggested that it is an inadequate way to 
conceive of God’s knowledge of God’s beloved creatures. Using scientific 
techniques to discover the secret thoughts of others may superficially appear to 
                                                     
62 Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 4.1, p. 211. 
63 This of course includes the scientific knowledge of human bodies, brains and 
minds that underpins modern medicine. Clearly, for some purposes, knowledge-
as-information concerning other human beings is valid, necessary and can be 
used for their good. Yet even in such contexts it is important to be aware of its 
limits: possessing this kind of knowledge is not the same as knowing the patient 
as a human person, or in theological perspective as a creature, reconciled sinner 
and heir of redemption.  
23 
 
This is the manuscript of an article accepted for publication in Studies in 
Christian Ethics. It is not the copy of record. Copyright © 2020, SAGE 
Publications. 
be an exercise of God-like knowledge. But to the extent that the knowledge 
sought is essentially knowledge-as-information, it is better understood as a 
parody or counterfeit of divine knowledge: more an attempt to be sicut deus than 
a reflection of the imago dei. 
Genesis 3 and the theological ethics of privacy 
The development of brain reading technologies might encourage us to think that 
almost God-like knowledge of one another’s secret thoughts is within our grasp. 
However, I have argued that it is a serious mistake to think of the knowledge-as-
information made possible by brain reading as truly God-like. Moreover, if 
human creatures bear the image of God, then the ways in which we are called to 
know one another should presumably reflect something of the character of God’s 
knowledge of us, rooted and grounded in God’s covenant love. Knowledge-as-
information is at best only a limited aspect, and at worst a distortion, of such 
knowledge. If this is so, then restraints on our knowledge of one another, 
particularly the gathering of information about one another, may be needed in a 
fallen world as a protection for both seekers and objects of that knowledge (and 
of course, many people are both seekers and objects, to varying extents and in 
different ways). Such restraints may protect seekers from the morally and 
spiritually dangerous conceit that the knowledge they seek is truly God-like, and 
objects of knowledge from forms of ‘observation’ that too easily lend themselves 
to coercive, manipulative or otherwise wrongful ends.  
Can privacy serve as such a restraint? Eric Stoddart suggests not. In a theological 
account of surveillance, he argues that asserting a right to privacy, while not 
without value, is an insufficient response to contemporary realities. Among the 
limitations of privacy rights-talk, according to Stoddart, it is too individualistic 
to respond to the complex social nature of current surveillance practices, it is 
insufficiently sensitive to differentials of power, and it does not adapt well to 
rapidly-changing contexts and practices of surveillance. He also believes that 
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Muers’ theological account, while an improvement on standard rights-based 
accounts, does not fully address their deficiencies.64 To go beyond these 
accounts of privacy, he coins the term ‘(in)visibility’ to refer to the complex 
‘dynamic of managing and negotiating our visibility in social spaces.’65 He 
points to biblical resources that can inform this practice of ‘managing and 
negotiating our visibility’: for example, the life of Moses, by turns hidden and 
visible in various ways, gospel narratives in which Jesus makes himself both 
visible and invisible, and strategies of (in)visibility adopted by early Christian 
communities in their relationships with their surrounding societies.66 
Stoddart is correct in drawing attention to the limitations of privacy rights-talk 
and the need to take fuller account of the complexities of power and social 
dynamics. His concept of (in)visibility may indeed be better suited to the 
complexities of contemporary surveillance, in which many members of society 
both watch and are watched in multifarious ways. Yet in the different context of 
brain reading, the discussion of issues such as neuromarketing and lie-detection 
has at its heart such questions as: How, why and with what limits might others 
legitimately try to gain access to our inward thoughts, feelings and desires? What 
level of control should we have over others’ access to our thoughts and mental 
states? These are still questions about privacy, which suggests that a 
theologically-informed ethic and practice of privacy is still important in this 
field. 
Its importance can be further elucidated by returning to Genesis 3. In the ‘Fall’ 
narrative the humans, having grasped the knowledge that makes them sicut deus, 
find their nakedness exposed and try to cover themselves with leaves. But God, 
pronouncing judgement upon them, makes ‘garments of skins’ to replace their 
                                                     
64 Stoddart, Theological Perspectives on a Surveillance Society, pp. 131-45. 
65 Ibid., p. 145. 
66 Ibid., pp. 159-68. 
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covering of leaves (Gen. 3:21). Bonhoeffer reads the ‘garments of skins’ as a 
metaphor for what, at this stage in his theological career, he calls ‘orders of 
preservation.’67 God ‘accompanies humankind on its way,’ accepting the fallen 
world as it is and participating in, not breaking, the ‘new laws’ that now apply. 
Yet God also restrains those laws by imposing order on them, and so 
demonstrates their sinful and fallen character. The orders that God imposes on 
the fallen world are not, however, eternal. ‘They are not orders of creation but 
orders of preservation,’ whose purpose is to ‘uphold and preserve us’ until ‘our 
life finds its end in – Christ.’ 
Bonhoeffer’s account is not without its own dangers. His concept of ‘orders of 
preservation,’ and even the language of ‘divine mandates,’ which he substitutes 
for it in later writing, perhaps make it too easy to claim divine sanction for 
contingent and contextual features of human social life.68 Perhaps this underlies 
the problems noted earlier with Bonhoeffer’s late essay on truth-telling.69 
However, with that caveat, his reading of the ‘garments of skins’ can help us 
make theological sense of the place of privacy in a fallen world. 
I noted earlier that privacy seems to have no ultimate significance in the light of 
Christian eschatological hope, and that there may be forms of human relationship 
                                                     
67 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, pp. 139-40. All quotations in the present 
paragraph are from these pages. 
68 Bonhoeffer’s rejection of the concept of ‘orders of creation’ was a response to 
its co-option by theologians sympathetic to National Socialism, and he 
abandoned the language of ‘orders of preservation’ when this too proved 
vulnerable to co-option: see Creation and Fall, p. 140 n. 3, and Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, Ethics (Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, vol. 6, ed. Ilse Tödt et al., trans. 
Reinhard Krauss, Charles C. West and Douglas W. Stott, Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress, 2005), pp. 389-90. 
69 See above, n. 57; cf. Muers, Keeping God’s Silence, pp. 192-93. 
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and community in the present age which witness to the openness to one another 
that is our eschatological destiny. In such communities or relationships, privacy 
could seem unimportant or irrelevant. But these are at best proleptic glimpses of 
God’s promised good future in the midst of a present reality that typically has a 
very different character. Moreover, even well-intentioned attempts to create such 
forms of Christian community can be vulnerable to damaging abuses of power 
and status,70 and openness and accountability may be taken advantage of by 
those exercising abusive forms of spiritual leadership.71 In the world as we find it 
– and even in the church as we find it – unreserved transparency and openness to 
one another would be a dangerously utopian ideal. In our present reality, privacy 
can be seen as an aspect of the ‘order’ that (Bonhoeffer argues) God imposes on 
the world: it both draws attention to and restrains the fallenness of the world, 
preserving human creatures for that eschatological future in which we can know 
fully and be fully known (1 Cor. 13:12). 
However, privacy rights as standardly framed may not be adequate to this task, 
for the reasons already outlined. Perhaps it is not pressing our metaphor from 
Genesis 3 too far to liken privacy rights-talk to the leaves with which the humans 
tried to cover themselves. What is needed instead is a theologically-informed 
ethic and practice of privacy that resembles the ‘garments of skins’: a more 
                                                     
70 One relatively recent example is the Charismatic ‘shepherding movement’ of 
the 1970s and 1980s, which was criticised for authoritarian and controlling forms 
of pastoral practice; some of the movement’s leaders subsequently 
acknowledged serious failings. See S. David Moore, The Shepherding 
Movement: Controversy and Charismatic Ecclesiology (London: T & T Clark, 
2003).  
71 See, e.g., Karen Lebacqz and Joseph D. Driskill, Ethics and Spiritual Care: A 
Guide for Pastors, Chaplains, and Spiritual Directors (Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon, 2000), pp. 127-52; David J. Ward, ‘The Lived Experience of Spiritual 
Abuse,’ Mental Health, Religion and Culture, 14.9 (2011), pp. 899-915. 
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complete and durable protection against coercive, manipulative or abusive forms 
of knowledge-gathering. 
Privacy and human flourishing 
What might this theological ethic and practice of privacy look like? Recalling 
Bonhoeffer’s and Muers’ insight that truth-telling and knowledge must be 
understood in the context of particular relationships, we might begin to develop 
it by distinguishing between those forms of knowledge and self-disclosure 
appropriate to particular human relationships, and those that are inappropriate to 
the same relationships. One way to make this distinction might be to ask what 
forms of knowledge and self-disclosure will enable those relationships to be 
most conducive to the flourishing of those involved as human creatures.  
By ‘flourishing,’ broadly speaking, I mean human creatures’ becoming more 
fully the creatures we have been made and called to be: fulfilling more 
completely God’s good purposes for us in creation, reconciliation and 
redemption.72 So understood, flourishing is a teleological category. Since the 
importance of privacy, theologically speaking, lies in its contribution to human 
flourishing, and its meaning is understood in terms of that contribution, privacy 
too has a teleological character. In theological perspective, privacy matters, and 
we understand what it means, in terms of what it is for.  
The discussion thus far has suggested various elements that would need to be 
part of such an understanding and practice of privacy. Insights from standard 
philosophical accounts need not be denied, even if they are insufficient on their 
                                                     
72 The ultimate fulfilment of God’s good purposes for us, of course, can only be 
brought about by God’s work in Christ, but in the present world, all kinds of 
circumstances and human activities can make a difference to the ‘penultimate’ 
fulfilment of those purposes. On the ultimate and the penultimate, see 
Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 146-70. 
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own. A theological account of privacy can concur that something like Tunick’s 
‘informational,’ ‘decisional’ and ‘local’ privacy are important aspects73 – though 
theologians should be wary of justifying them, as he does, in terms of personal 
autonomy. Hayden Ramsay, under the influence of the ‘new natural law’ theory 
of Finnis, Boyle and Grisez, adds two further aspects, which he argues are at 
least as important: solitude and domestic privacy.74 In light of Stoddart’s 
critique, a theological account should also attend to the social dimensions of our 
self-disclosure and knowledge of one another. Moreover, it would be important 
to remain alert to the complex operations of power in relation to privacy, 
knowledge and self-disclosure. In the context of brain reading, this alertness 
would not be limited to the uses of coercive power by states or other actors, but 
should also include (among other things) the imbalances of power between 
different groups or sections of society,75 and the ‘disciplinary’ effects on the 
moral subjectivity of those who were, or might be, the objects of brain reading.76 
All these elements would need to be set in the context of a broad theological 
understanding of human flourishing: what forms of interpersonal and social 
relationship would be conducive to our greater fulfilment as human creatures in 
relation to God, to our ‘near and distant neighbours’ and the other creatures with 
which we share this world, in our own embodied lives, and in our particular 
situations and vocations?77 What practices of knowledge, self-disclosure, 
                                                     
73 Tunick, ‘Privacy and Punishment,’ p. 650. 
74 Hayden Ramsay, ‘Privacy, Privacies and Basic Needs,’ Heythrop Journal 51 
(2010), pp. 288-97. 
75 Cf. Muers, Keeping God’s Silence, pp. 192-93. 
76 Cf. Foucault, Power/Knowledge; Arrigo, ‘Punishment, Freedom, and the 
Culture of Control,’ pp. 473-76; see above, n. 43. 
77 This way of schematising various domains of human flourishing is somewhat 
influenced by Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol 3.4 (ed. G. W Bromiley and T. 
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exposure or concealment, solitude and domesticity might support such 
relationships? What forms and operations of power might be supportive of them, 
or detrimental to them? 
Some practical conclusions 
To attempt a complete and general answer to those questions would be an 
extensive task. The allusion to ‘particular situations and vocations’ also signals 
that it could have its dangers. Bonhoeffer’s insistence on the particular and 
contextual character of truth-telling should make us wary of giving overly 
abstract and generalised accounts of knowledge, self-disclosure and privacy.78 
An alternative approach, therefore, would focus on more concrete, specific cases, 
asking whether the practices of knowledge, self-disclosure and so forth found in 
them were conducive or detrimental to relationships and social structures that 
supported the flourishing of those involved. In that spirit, I conclude with the 
briefest of remarks on the two applications of brain reading on which this article 
has focused. 
1. Neuromarketing: The only neuromarketing approach likely to be currently 
feasible involves using brain imaging data from volunteers to design marketing 
interventions intended to influence other people’s affective responses. In other 
words, such interventions are attempts to manipulate consumers’ desires, by 
means that largely evade their conscious control, to induce them to want and buy 
things that they probably do not need. As argued earlier, the fact that the data 
informing these interventions come from volunteers does not allay privacy 
concerns; in Tunick’s terms, this activity would seem to threaten the ‘decisional 
privacy’ of those targeted by the marketing. In other words, such interventions, if 
                                                     
F. Torrance, trans. A. T. MacKay et al., Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1961). The 
phrase ‘Near and distant neighbours’ is the section heading of pp. 285-323. 
78 Cf. Bonhoeffer, ‘What Does it Mean to Tell the Truth?’ 
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successful, would undermine the agency of those targeted, which in theological 
perspective would be to the detriment of their flourishing as human creatures. 
Moreover, in theological perspective, the goal of such interventions seems to be 
the disordering of desire: to induce a form of pleonexia or greed. Christian 
tradition would see this as detrimental to a person’s flourishing in relation to 
God, since pleonexia is associated in Christian thought with idolatry (cf. Col. 
3:5). Forms of pleonexia that motivate increased consumption of ‘stuff’ may also 
be implicated in social injustices (such as the exploitation of the workers who 
produce the goods) and ecologically damaging uses of natural resources.79 
Presumably one goal of some neuromarketing interventions would be to make 
consumers less inclined to ask critical questions about such damaging effects. 
There are multiple reasons, then, why a Christian theological analysis should 
take a dim view of neuromarketing. The concerns raised are, at least in part, 
privacy concerns – specifically, concerns about decisional privacy – but the 
theological analysis I have outlined sets these concerns in a broader social and 
ecological context than standard philosophical accounts would. Of course, 
similar concerns could also be raised to some extent about more conventional 
marketing practices,80 even though neuromarketing represents a considerable 
extension and intensification of what has hitherto been possible. Ethical 
                                                     
79 A case in point is the increasing concern about ‘throwaway fashion’: see 
House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Fixing Fashion: Clothing 
Consumption and Sustainability (HC 1952, 19 February 2019), online at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmenvaud/1952/report
-summary.html (accessed 29 November 2019). 
80 A point in effect acknowledged by Wilson et al., ‘Neuromarketing and 
Consumer Free Will,’ e.g. p. 389. 
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reflection on neuromarketing might also draw attention to other practices that 
should cause similar concerns. 
2. Neuroscience-based lie detection in law enforcement and criminal justice: I 
suggested earlier that the understandings of truth-telling, knowledge and 
judgement found in accounts of this practice resemble human knowledge sicut 
deus rather than the ‘hearing knowledge’ and loving justice that would more 
truly reflect the imago dei. This might encourage a suspicious attitude towards 
the use of brain reading in policing and criminal justice. Yet it could plausibly be 
responded that it simply reflects the realities of a fallen world: there is real and 
terrible evil in human societies, and harsh coercive measures are sometimes 
needed to restrain it. Accordingly, Christians have often been ready to see 
policing and criminal justice in the way Bonhoeffer understands the ‘garments of 
skins’ in Genesis 3: as an aspect of the order provided by God for a fallen world, 
to restrain its fallenness and preserve its inhabitants. This view has found 
expression in accounts of ‘just policing’ by authors from both pacifist and just-
war traditions.81 
Could neuroscience-based lie detection be part of the practice of just policing? 
Two considerations might give us pause before affirming it too readily. One is 
the nature of the privacy infringement that it entails. Gaining access to people’s 
                                                     
81 From pacifist and just-war traditions respectively, see Gerald W. Schlabach, 
‘Just Policing: How War Could Cease to Be a Church-Dividing Issue,’ Journal 
of Ecumenical Studies 41.3-4 (2004), pp. 409-30, and Tobias Winright, ‘Faith, 
Justice, and Ferguson: Insights for Religious Educators from a Law Enforcement 
Officer Turned Theological Ethicist,’ Religious Education 113.3 (2018), pp. 
244-52, DOI: 10.1080/00344087.2018.1450608. However, for a theological 
critique of ‘just policing,’ see Nathan Colborne, ‘A Peace Crueler than War? Just 
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inner thoughts or mental states is not merely a matter of acquiring private 
information about them, but impinges upon what Ramsay, quoting Robert 
George, calls their ‘interiority,’ their ‘sense of a personal inner sanctum.’82 This 
is not to say that the boundaries of this inner sanctum may never be crossed – 
Ramsay allows that they may ‘in the name of justice’83 – but it indicates the 
moral seriousness of such an infringement. It could be said that neuroscience-
based lie detection, particularly if people are effectively coerced into undergoing 
it, is a form of force, albeit not physical force. A second consideration, informed 
by Foucault’s account of disciplinary power, is the effect on our moral 
subjectivity if we knew that agents of the state had the power to look inside our 
heads and extract information about our thoughts, knowledge and truthfulness, 
bypassing our own choices about how we communicate our thoughts and 
knowledge to others. If this were to become a widespread practice, it could over 
time bring about significant shifts in citizens’ moral self-understanding and their 
relationships to their political communities. 
Neither of these considerations amounts to a knock-down argument against the 
use of neuroscience-based lie detection, by they do indicate its problematic 
character, and place a burden of justification on those who would include it in 
the practice of just policing. If we also consider how limited and unreliable the 
technology is at present, and the grave harm that has resulted from its premature 
use, there are good reasons to rule it out at least for the present.  
Conclusion 
Privacy is a central issue in much ethical discussion of brain reading, and I have 
proposed that it remain so in theological reflection on this topic. Yet I have also 
                                                     
82 Ramsay, ‘Privacy, Privacies and Basic Needs,’ p. 290, quoting Robert George, 
Making Men Moral (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 210–17. 
83 Ramsay, ‘Privacy, Privacies and Basic Needs,’ p. 290. 
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argued that in theological perspective, the understanding and practice of privacy 
must be richer and broader in scope than in standard rights-based accounts, 
attending to the forms of knowledge and self-disclosure conducive to the 
flourishing of human creatures in interpersonal and social relationships. In this 
perspective, it is perfectly possible that some applications of brain reading could 
be evaluated quite positively. However, the two applications considered in this 
article attract significant concerns about the character of the knowledge sought, 
the goals towards which it might be directed and the individual and social effects 
of such knowledge-seeking.  
Brain reading is not alone in challenging privacy, and other technologies may 
even pose more immediate threats.84 But given the interest in brain reading and 
the hopes and aspirations often attached to it, it is certainly worth assessing in 
the way I have attempted. Indeed, the far-reaching and startling possibilities that 
it appears to offer may make it a particularly helpful focal lens for a theological 
re-examination of the ethics of privacy. 
 
                                                     
84 As Neil Levy argues: Neuroethics, pp. 147-55. 
